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'PESTS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INSANE.
EDwIN R.

KEEDY.*

A consideration of the tests of criminal responsibility of the
insane requires a careful defining of the phrase "criminal responsibility." Responsibility means acountability for one's actions to some
superior power, which in this case is the criminal law. The tests of
criminal responsibility are the rules which determine the guilt (upon
which punishment is based) of those who cause certain injuries, carefully defined by the law, to individuals or society in general. According as the law of one sovereignty differs from another, so responsibility varies; hence, criminal responsibility means one thing in England. another in Germany, and it means a different thing in Illinois
from what it means in New York. The criminal responsibility of the
insane means, then, the liability of those who are mentally disordered to be punished for certain wrongs as defined by the law of
the place where the wrong was done.'
The insanity (I am using th term to include the whole class of
mental ailments, i. e., in the sense of mental disorder) of a defendant
may have to be considered by the court in three different connections,
determined by the time when the insanity was shown to exist: (1) insanity at the time of the doing of the wrong;' (2) insanity at the
time of trial; (3) insanity after conviction. The third is of importance in affixing the punishment; the second determines whether the
defendant can be tried, but the first, and the first only, has to do with
the question of the defendant's guilt. Hence, the insanity that is
material in determining responsibility for a wrong committed, is that
which existed at the time the wrong was done. The character of
treatment for one who is insane after trial and conviction, whether
*Professor of Law in Northwestern University.
From a paper read before the Physicians' Club of Chicago. In the paper
as read there was a discussion of the law of Illinois as to insanity in criminal
cases. This portion of the paper is omittdd here.
'In a recent book (Oppenheimer, "The Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics"), the author discusses learnedly and at length the nature of criminal responsibility.
."The forms of insanity in which crime is usually committed are mania,
epileptic insanity, delusional insanity and alcoholic insanity, and sometimes
puerperal insanity, delusional and homicidal melancholia, sometimes dementia
and congenital imbecility, and also impulsive insanity, where there are uncontrollable homicidal, kleptomaniacal, pyromaniacal, destructive or animal impulses." Clouston, "Mental Diseases." 685.
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penal or remedial, or both, is an important question, but is not involved in a consideration of the tests of criminal responsibility, as
strictly understood.
I have thought it advisable to define the phrase rather carefully,
because in many writings on the subject the point has not always
been clearly understood. Thus criminal responsibility in this connection has been treated as synonymous with moral responsibility,3
and even of religious responsibility,4 and again, as responsibility to
the law as it ought to be and not as it is.'
As criminal responsibility is a purely legal question, so insanity
is a medical one which must be answered by the physician. He must
decide, and is the only one qualified to decide, whether an individual
is suffering from a mental disorder, and if so, to determine its character, just as he is the only one who can properly diagnose a case
of physical ill-health.
It follows, then, that the subject of the criminal responsibility
of the insane in its final analysis involves a dual question: that of
insanity for the physician, and that of criminal responsibility for the
lawyer. It is as absurd for a judge to attempt to decide the insanity
of qn individual, as for a physician to say whether a defendant is
guilty of larceny. If the members of either profession have crossed
the boundary line and invaded the province of the other, it is worth
our while to seek an explanation for such conduct.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the symptoms of
what are now recognized as mental diseases were attributed to the
possession of the victim by the devil. One so possessed was considered as perversely wicked and hence to be treated with great harshness, and when brought before the court for a wrong done to be
punished with the utmost vigor.6 It is not without interest to note
that in the United States, and as late as 1862, this supernatural
view was suggested in a judicial opinion. In State v. Brando7 the
court said: "The law does not recognize any moral power compelling one to do what he knows is -wrong. 'To know the right and still
the wrong pursue' proceeds from a perverse will brought about by
the seductions of the evil one. * * * * If the prisoner knew that what
'See Maudsley, "Responsibility in Mental Diseases," IO2. Stephen, "Hist.
Crim. Law of Eng." (Vol. II), 127 discusses Maudsley's view.
'Charge of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope to jury in Gibson Case (I844), Justiciary Reports (Scotland), 2 Broun 332, cited in i Jur. Rev. 241.
'Mfercier, "Criminal Responsibility," 8.
'Maudsley, "Responsibility in Mental Diseases," 9-11. See article "Insanity
in its Relation to the Criminal Law," by Charles Scott, i Jurid. Rev. 237, 240.
8 Jones (N. C.) 463.
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he did was wrong, the law presumes that he had the power to resist
it, against all supernatural agencies, and holds him amenable to
punishment."
The attitude towards the insane was not greatly changed when
in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries there
was same recognition of the fact that their abnormalities were due
to disease. The first judicial utterances regarding insanity as a
defense to a criminal charge were in the early part of the eighteenth
century, when the conception of insanity was still extremely vague,
and to' a large extent incorrect; and when medical treatment consisted chiefly of manacles and the lash.
In 1724 the trial judge in Arnold's case8 told the jury that
"where a man is totally deprived of his understanding and memory
and does not know what he is doing any more than an infant or wild
beast, he will properly be exempted from punishment." This was a
reflection of the popular attitude toward the insane.
In the trial of Earl Ferrers' in 1760, the jury were told that
ifthe defendant was able to comprehend the nature of his actions,
and could discriminate between moral right and wrong, he should
not be acquitted. Similar charges were given to the jury in all eases
where insanity was a defense up to the year 1843. It must be particularly noted that the only expressions of judicial opinion on insanity as a defense were found in the instructions of the trial judges
to the jury. According to the custom that has always prevailed in
England"° the court, in instructing the jury, expressed its opinion
upon the evidence; hence the statements of the judges in these early
cases were not made as propositions of law, but represented in large
part the medical view of the period regarding insanity as stated in
testimony.
In the trial of Hadfield" in 1800 for high treason, in shooting
at George III, the defense was insanity. It was shown in evidence
that the defendant, at the time of the shooting, suffered from morbid
delusions, but understood perfectly the nature and significance of his
act. Kenyon, C. J., ruled that the defendant ought to be acquitted.
This result was due to the eloquence, of Erskine, counsel for the
prisoner, rather than to the recognition of a new test of respoilstbility.
"i6St. Tr. 695.
gig St. Tr. 886.
"A striking instance of this occurred recently in the trial of a defendant for
murder. See Appeal of Ethel Harding, i Crim. App. Cas. 219 i898).
"27 St. Tr. 1281.
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In 1843 one M'Naghten 12 was acquitted of a charge of murder,
the defense being that the defendant was suffering from insane
delusions. The medical witnesses testified that a person might suffer
from delusions while otherwise of perfectly sound mind, and that
the defendant was in this condition. The jury were told that if the
prisoner was capable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect
to the act with which he was charged, that he was a responsible
agent and liable to punishment. After the acquittal the House of
Lords propounded certain questions to the judges as to the law with
respect to alleged crimes committed by persons affected with insane
delusions, and how the jury should be instructed in cases where insanity was a defense. The judges replied that as matter of law the
jury should be told what, in effect, is this, that to establish a defense
on the ground of insanity, it must be shown that the prisoner was
unable to distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the
act which is alleged to be a crime. This answer was based upon the
instructions to the jury by the judges in the preceding cases, with
the addition of the qualification as to the particular act.
The judges replied to the question of the lords, as to the law
governing a case where defendant was suffering from delusions, as
follows: "Making the assumption that he labours under such par'Lial delusion only and is not in other respects insane, we think he
must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if
the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real." The
judges thereby legally recognized two symptoms of mental disorder,
one of which, viz., delusions, had never been expressly recognized
in a criminal case before.
Many pages have been written in criticism of these rules of the
judges,"' both as to their correctness, and as to the weight to be
given them, since they were not made in a regular judicial proceeding. It is not my purpose to discuss these criticisms, but the point I
wish to emphasize at this place is this, that the tests of the trial
judges, on which the answers of the judges in McNaghten's case
were based, were not the result of reasoning with reference to the
fundamental principles of the law regarding criminal responsibility,
but simply grew up from the necessities of the case, and were based
upon the evidence at a time when even the medical profession had
but a very narrow view 'of the scope and character of mental
disorders.
1io

Clark & Finnelly, 2oo.

Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law of Eng., 154 et seq. Maudsley, "Responsibility
in Mental Disease," 95 et seq.
":2
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The test as to delusions was the conclusion from the premise
that the person, so affected was otherwise perfectly sane. And it
must be remembered that this was based upon the testimony of the
physicians at the trial. This premise, now entirely refuted, 4 was in
perfect accord with the psychology of the time, which regarded the
functions of the brain as divided into distinct parts, each of which
had a considerable independence of the others. According to this
-view, either function might be impaired without causing a disturbance of the others. 5
The answers of the judges in .McNaghten's case have been without modification, the law of England ever since,"6 and, with modification in some instances, the law of most of the states of this country.
Tests which grew up in a period of superstition, originally referring
to the evidence in the particular case, and never having any foundation in the principles of the criminal law, and which brought into
being the anomalous phrase "criminal insanity." 3.
While the judges were applying narrow and obsolete medical
facts, which they had crystallized into canons of law, the members
of the medical profession, dissatisfied with the results of trials, in
which persons were convicted who were suffering from mental disorders affecting not only their judgment but their power of control, expressed in writings and in their testimony as witnesses, their
opinions as to the criminal guilt of'those, who were affected with
mental disorder.
Thus it will be seen that the encroachments of one profession
upon the logical boundaries of the others were not due to a desire
to trespass, but grew out of the real difficulties and peculiarities of
the subject in which both were interested.
In addition to the two symptoms of mental disorder which were
"Mercier, "Criminal Responsibility," 174; 2 Stephen, "Hist. Crim. Law of
Eng." 157, i61; Ray, Med. Jud. of Insan. 283; article by Morton Prince, M. D.,
in 49 Jour. Amer. Med. Ass'n, 1643, 1645.
"See Paton, "Psychiatry," ig.
"Criminal Code of England (1892, unaltered by the Amendment Act of
igoo), Title I, Part II, Sec. ii.
In the case before the English Court of Criminal Appeal on February ir,
19ro, an appeal was brought against a verdict of insanity upon an indictment
for murder. In affirming the verdict and dismissing the appeal the court said:
"It is beyond dispute that he is liable to epileptic seizures and homicidal impulses that, he cannot control." Appeal of Albert Williams Ireland, 4 Crim.
App. Cas. 87. Does this indicate the beginning of a tendency in England to
depart from the strict rule of M'Naghten's Case?
"In State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (87o), and Parsons v. State, 8i Ala. 577
(1886), it was .clearly recognized that there should be no legal test of insanity.
The ablest judicial discussion of the relation of insanity to thecriminal law appears in the opinion of Doe, J., in State v. Pike, and that of Somerville, J., in
Parsons v. State.
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covered by the answers of the judges in McNaghten's -Case, a third
has been recognized as a defense by some of the courts in this.
country, viz., an irresistible or uncontrollable impulse, where the
defendant by reason of mental disease has lost control over his
actions. I realize that this phrase has been much criticized," yet
and Diffendorf' in his American adaptation
as James," Clouston 20
of Kraepelin use it, I may infer that it is in good repute. When
this defense was urged upon the courts, they were in some instances
much confused by the relation which this symtom of mental disorder bears to the inability to distinguish between right and wrong,
and some seemed to be of the opinion that one symptom embraced the
other. Some courts concerned themselves with the purely medical
side of the question, and expressed opinions as to whether a person
could suffer from an irresistible impulse and still be able to distinguish right from wrong. Thus the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia,"' through one of its justices, said: "For myself, I
cannot see how a person who rationally comprehends the nature and
quality of an act, and knows that itis wrong and criminal, can act
through irresistible innocent impulse. Knowing the nature of the
act well enough to make him otherwise liable for it under the law,
can we say that he acts from irresistible impulse and not criminal
design and guilt?*** *I admit the existence of irresistible impulse,
and its efficacy to exonerate from responsibility, but not as consistent with an adequate realization of the wrong of the act."
In some instances, while judges personally recognize the medical and psychological fact that a person may be subject to an
uncontrollable impulse, while still able to distinguish right from
wrong, they hesitated to accept this as a defense, because they
felt that such a condition was readily confused with a case where
the defendant acted in a passion of hate or rage. The difficulties
of proof with reference to mental conditions retarded the judicial
recognition of symptoms scientifically established.
I have attempted to show the manner in which the present law
on the subject of the criminal responsibility of the insane has
grown up, not deduced from legal principles, but derived from faulty
views of medical and psychologicel science, and influenced by
prejudice and superstition. These retarding influences are now
"See Mercier, "Criminal Responsibility,"
"James, "Psychology," Vol. 2, 425.
"Clouston, "Mental Diseases," 337, 685.
'Diffendorf, "Clinical Psychiatry," 93.
'State v. Harrison,36 W. Va. 729 (1892).

128-131.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INSANE.

absent, and there is a clearer conception of the effect of
-disease on psychological phenomena. It is therefore suggested that
the subject be considered de novo with a view of determining whether
a test of criminal responsibility can be found that will be in accord with legal principles, and at the same time satisfy the demands of medical science.
The fundamental principle of our criminal law, recognized from
earliest times, is, that one must do a criminal act with criminal
intent in order to be convicted of a crime. There must be a concurrence of act and intent. This is the general test of criminal
responsbility. The term "act" as used in the law means more than
mere physical movement, even though accompanied by a physical
result. The movement must be due to volition to constitute an act.
This is the well accepted view of the leading writers on jurisprudence.2" It follows, then, that if there is no volition, there is no
act; and if no act, then no crime. The first question in a criminal
prosecution should be: has the defendant committed a criminal act?
Suppose'B takes A's hand and with it strikes C, this is clearly not
A's act. Suppose B strikes A below the knee, as a result of which
A's leg flies up and strikes C. This is not A's act. Suppose A is
suffering from locomotor ataxia, and as a symtom of the disease
his foot flies out and strikes C. This again is not A's act. Suppose
A. while tossing in the delirium of typhoid fever flings his arm
against C. I do not think any judge would have difficulty in saying
that this was not A's act and that he was, thereforei not guilty of
a crime. Now, suppose A's hand strikes C because of an uncontrollable impulse, the symptom of mental disease. No distinction can be
drawn between these cases, and yet many courts would not allow A a
defense in the last case. Others would allow the defense without a
consideration of the legal principle involved.. When, therefore, it
can be shown that the defendant's physical movement which caused
the injury in question was due to an uncontrollable impulse he
should not be convicted, which conclusion is based upon the most
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence.
"="Determinations of the will, and such motions of the body as are consequent upon determinations of the will, are (I conceive) the only objects to
which the term 'act' can be applied with propriety." Austin, "Jurisprudence"
(4th ed.), 376.
"An act is the bodily movement which follows immediately upon a volition."
Markby, "Elements of Law" (3rd ed.), Sec. 215."
"An 'Act' may therefore be defined, for the purposes of the science, as a
determination of the will, producing an effect in the sensible world." Holland,
"Jurisprudence" (3rd ed.), 89.
"We mean by it (act) any event which is subject to the control of the will."
Salmoncf, "Jurisprudence" (2nd ed.), 527.
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The criminal intent, which is also necessary to create responsibility, is not a constant quantity, but varies with different crimes.
Killing must be accompanied with one state of mind to constitute
murder, with another to constitute manslaughter. The mental element necessary for burglary is different from that which will make
a destruction of property malicious mischief. If the prosecution
fails to prove the existence of the requisite state of mind, when this
is questioned by the defendant, there can be no conviction of the
crime charged. Anything which negatives the necessary criminal
intent negatives responsibility. 'Thus mistake of fact is in some
cases a defense-not for the reason that the defendant was mistaken,
but because he did not have the criminal intent by reason of the
mistake. A mistake that will negative the necessary intent in one
case may not do so in another. The particular defense must be
considered with reference to the requisites of the particular crime
charged. -4
If then, a defendant is indicted for a clime, and his defense
is that he was suffering from some form of mental disorder at the
time the wrong was done, the inquiry, in accordance with legal
principles should not be: "Is the defendant insane?" but "Did the
defendant, while suffering from this particular form of mental disorder, commit an act with the intent required by the particular
crime charged?" This inquiry is concerned with the symptoms of
the mental disorder, and not with the vague nomenclature of insanity.
The statement has sometimes been made by judges that insanity may negative the criminal intent. The fault of this statement lies in the fact that it assumes criminal intent is a constant
quantity, and that insanity is the name of a particular disease.
Though the great majority of the cases in which insanity was set
up as a defense, were prosecutions for murder, yet following are
some of the crimes of which defendants have been convicted when
the defense was insanity: rape,2' burglary, - forgery, 2 running illicit distillery,"8 larceny,2 mailing obscene literature, 30 passing
21n State v. SiMms, 71 Mo. 538 (88o), upon an indictment for murder the
defense was erotomania. In discussing this defense the court said (p. 540) : "No
connection is perceivable between a species of monomania which leads to the
commission of rape, and that which leads to homicide."
'Bothwell v. State, 71 Neb. 747 (19o4; State v. Miller, i Mo. 542 (1892).
"eHays v. Commonwealth, 33 S. W. (Kan.), 1104 (896).
'Langdon v. People, 133 Ill. 382. (1890).
"U. S. v. Ridgeway, 31 Fed. 144 (1887).
"Gruber v. State, 3 W. Va. 699 (1869) ; People v. Cumimins, 47 Mich. 334
(1882).

"U. S. v. Faulkner, 35 Fed. 730 (1888).
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forged instrument,3' abduction,3 2 arson,33 embezzelement, 4 robbery,"
slander,". and incest."
Each of these crimes involves a different
mental state.
The ordinary test of criminal responsibilty will likewise cover the
so-called border line cases, when some symptoms of mental disorder
appear, but are not sufficiently marked or numerous to justify the
use of a term which distinguishes the patient from the generality of
his fellow-men. The symptoms should be measured with reference to
the particular mental state which is a part of the crime charged.
Under this test each profession will occupy its proper province.
The physician will determine the defendant's mental state, and the
judge and jury will decide whether this mental state justifies conviction of the crime charged.
'Riley v. State, 44 S. W. (Tex. C. A.) 498 (I898).
'Walker v. People, 26 Hun. 67 (ISI).
Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225 (18 9); State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591
(1873).
'U. S. v. ChisohM, 153 Fed. 8o8 (i9o7); State v. Berry, 179 Mo. 377 (19o4);
U. S. v. Young, 25 Fed. 710 (1885).
5
"People v. Sprague, 2 Parker Cr. Rep. (N. Y.) 43 (849); People v. Ford,
138 Cal. 140 (90:2).
"'Kelley v. State, Ioi S. NV. (Tex. C. A.) 23o (19o7).
3
Schwartz v. State, 65 Neb. 196 (902).

